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Effective Corrections Oversight: 
What Can We Learn from ACA  
Standards and Accreditation? 
 
David M. Bogard, M.P.A., J.D. 
 
This brief essay will discuss the nexus between the 
standards and accreditation process of the American 
Correctional Association (ACA) and the call for increased 
external oversight of our nation’s jails, prisons, and juvenile 
detention and correctional facilities. 
By way of background, the American Correctional 
Association is a private, non-profit professional association 
representing corrections practitioners.  Among the activities it 
promotes are two that pertain directly to the issue of 
corrections oversight—the promulgation of standards and the 
maintenance of an accreditation process.  These two functions 
work hand-in-hand but, as will be explained below, are also 
somewhat severable. 
ACA publishes more than twenty distinct manuals of 
correctional standards, covering a variety of facility types and 
programs, including prisons, jails, juvenile detention facilities, 
juvenile correctional facilities, probation/parole, and numerous 
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others.  In addition, over the past several years, ACA has 
ventured into the all-important realm of institutional health 
care standards, publishing its first such manual of standards 
for health care in 2002. 
The ACA Standards Committee, composed of twenty 
members with extensive corrections expertise, such as prison 
and jail administrators, community corrections administrators, 
attorneys, architects, consultants, etc., promulgates standards 
for all the manuals.  Members represent all realms of 
corrections—adult and juvenile, institutional and field, long-
term and shorter-term facilities and programs.  The Standards 
Committee meets twice a year to consider the adoption of new 
or revised standards, typically acting on recommendations that 
come from the field through an active and formal solicitation 
process.  Recommended changes to standards are generated by 
prisoners’ advocacy organizations; managers of facilities; 
architects, consultants, and others who use the standards; 
physicians and other health care providers who provide care in 
correctional institutions; as well as by members of the 
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections who must 
interpret and rely on these standards in the context of their 
accreditation decisions (more on this later).  Several of the 
positions on the Standards Committee are held by Commission 
members, who bring to the table their individual expertise and 
knowledge of how the standards are used in the accreditation 
process. 
Standards Committee decisions are frequently subject to 
robust discussion and debate, and persons recommending 
changes are afforded the opportunity to address the Committee 
directly.  Debate often centers on whether proposals will serve 
to “water down” standards or make them more practical and 
achievable.  Members of the Committee who are administrators 
will frequently voice concern about the cost of implementing 
proposed standards and whether the bodies that fund them will 
agree to absorb the cost implications of adherence to proposed 
standards.  Occasionally, attorneys will propose changes to 
standards to reflect changes in law based on federal statutes or 
appellate court decisions.  New or revised standards are 
sometimes the inevitable product of compromises forged to 
address concerns, albeit not to the degree or in the same 
manner that some would prefer.  Moreover, sometimes 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/17
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standards are not modified as proposed because the Committee 
does not believe that the issue is of sufficient gravity to 
warrant a change, or because it is believed that the value of 
continuity outweighs the need for change. 
The decisions of the Standards Committee are typically 
reflected in the inclusion of new or modified standards in 
supplements, which are published every two years, and in new 
manuals that are released about every ten years. 
Since 2001, there has been a significant push toward the 
adoption of performance-based standards.  This new focus on 
results, as opposed to the prescriptive approach that goes to 
only what or how something ought to be done, is a positive 
change.  Recently published manuals for jails (Adult Local 
Detention Facilities), community residential facilities, 
correctional industries, and correctional healthcare have been 
prepared to reflect this new approach.  The performance-based 
standards include: standards (statements that define a 
required condition to be achieved), outcome measures 
(measurable events or conditions that demonstrate whether the 
performance standard has been achieved), expected practices 
(actions and activities that should produce the desired 
outcome), protocols (written instructions that guide 
implementation, such as policies and procedures, forms, etc.), 
and process indicators (documentation and other evidence that 
can be examined to determine that practices are being 
implemented properly). 
Standards are grouped into such categories as “Safety,” 
“Care,” “Justice,” and “Security.”  Many can be said to be 
aspirational, although others might be viewed as “minimum” 
standards and myriad others will fall somewhere in between.  
Of the more than 400 standards in each manual, approximately 
10% will be weighted as “Mandatory”—these standards are 
generally those that most directly and profoundly affect 
institutional policies and practices that have the most direct 
impact on the health and life safety of inmates and staff.  For 
example, many of the mandatory standards are in the area of 
fire safety, while others drive critical health care concerns or 
govern the use of force and restraints. 
In 2002, a substantial effort resulted in the substantial 
reconciliation of ACA’s standards with those of the 
international community, specifically the United Nations’ 
3
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Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.  At that time, 
some international standards were deemed by U.S. corrections 
professionals to be either outdated or just inconsistent with 
contemporary best practices, such as those that required that 
prisoners’ families be allowed to bring food to them, or the 
practice of strict separation based on legal status (as opposed to 
more contemporary best practices, employed especially in jails, 
of disaggregating and classifying based on risk and behavior, 
and doing so based on validated objective scales and measures). 
Many correctional agencies use the ACA standards as a 
foundation on which to base their policies and procedures, even 
without committing to the accreditation process.  According to 
the ACA website, there are some 130 accredited jails (out of 
more than 3,300)1 and 5902 accredited prisons throughout the 
country.  But myriad others have modeled their processes and 
expected practices on the ACA standards, and architects and 
consultants typically design facilities or recommend practices 
in strict compliance with the standards. 
Separate and apart from the publishing of standards, ACA 
also maintains an accreditation process.  It is voluntary in most 
instances inasmuch as accreditation by ACA is typically not 
required and agencies enter into the process on their own 
volition.  There are exceptions to this rule, however.  For 
example, the Maine legislature passed a law requiring that all 
of that state’s adult and juvenile institutions take all necessary 
steps to become accredited3, and the vast majority of contracts 
between government agencies and private contractors for 
facility operations require the operator to obtain and maintain 
accreditation as a strict contractual mandate.  Occasionally, 
courts will mandate compliance with standards or 
accreditation, or parties to a settlement agreement may make 
this a requirement.  But, for the most part, accreditation is a 
voluntary process, undertaken by agency administrators who 
recognize the value of the process in terms of improved 
operations. 
 
1. E-mail from Kathy B. Dennis, Director, Standards and Accreditation 
of the American Correctional Association, to author (Apr. 19, 2010) (on file 
with author).  Note that the number of accredited jails includes federal jails, 
immigration detention centers, and other non-county/city level jails. 
2. Id.  The 590 figure includes publicly and privately operated prisons. 
3. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-a, § 1215 (2009). 
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The accreditation process is also fee-based; agencies pay 
ACA for the costs associated with their audits and the 
maintenance of the overall structure that governs and 
implements accreditation.  It is a moneymaking venture for 
ACA that helps to support the full range of its professional 
development activities.  And, with the fee-based system 
naturally come concerns (and rumors) about the power of the 
candidate agencies to directly or indirectly influence decision-
making.  To the degree that these rumors continue to circulate, 
or such influence does actually occur,4 it serves to compromise 
the integrity and value of the accreditation process as an 
oversight mechanism. 
The accreditation function is overseen and managed by a 
combination of paid ACA staff and a board of commissioners.  
The Commission on Accreditation for Corrections is composed 
of twenty-eight practitioners representing both adult and 
juvenile corrections, institutional and community.  In addition 
to agency and facility administrators, the Commission includes 
attorneys (including a representative of the American Bar 
Association), an architect (selected by the American Institute of 
Architects) as well as corrections consultants, physicians, 
nurses, and citizens not employed in corrections. 
Agencies that apply for accreditation must first employ a 
self-evaluation, which then triggers the ACA audit.  The self-
evaluation is an internal review, typically conducted by agency 
staff but frequently undertaken by colleagues from other 
nearby facilities to inject a more objective perspective of the 
agency’s status of compliance before ACA auditors arrive.  
Where agencies discover that they are not as compliant as they 
believed they would, or should, be at a certain juncture, they 
can delay the audit to allow for additional time to correct the 
deficiencies that were discovered via the self-evaluation 
process.  After the self-evaluation is submitted to ACA, the 
audit is scheduled and an audit team, comprised of three to 
four experienced correctional practitioners (typically including 
one with corrections health care expertise), is selected. 
Prior to arriving on site, the facility is required to post 
notice of the audit to all inmates, including an invitation to 
 
4. In eight years as a commissioner on the Commission on Accreditation 
for Corrections, I did not experience any external pressure or undue 
interference with panel decisions concerning accreditation. 
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send confidential communications to the audit team in advance 
of their arrival and to speak with auditors while they are on-
site (this occurs occasionally).  The audits typically last two or 
three days, depending on the size of the institution.  Auditors 
review files of documentation provided by the agency as 
evidence of compliance with the applicable standards.  The 
team visits all areas of the facility, speaking with staff and 
inmates along the way.  In addition to speaking privately and 
confidentially with any inmates who indicated a desire to speak 
with the team before or during the audit, auditors generally 
select inmates with whom they will speak informally, during 
the course of their tours of the facility, and have free reign as to 
which inmates they will interview.  The results of these 
interviews are summarized in the audit report (e.g., “numerous 
inmates complained about the temperature of food,” or “there 
was general agreement among the 70 inmates interviewed that 
it takes too long to see a nurse”).  The results of inquiries into 
more specific complaints raised by individual inmates are also 
published, which typically result in auditors checking inmate 
records, or interviewing staff, to determine whether the 
complaints are valid or indicative of larger concerns. 
While a significant element of the audit involves paper 
documentation, the auditors are also tasked with assessing the 
climate of the facility and the quality of life for inmates and 
staff.  Here, the auditors go beyond the four corners of the more 
than 400 standards, to evaluate such issues as safety, 
sanitation, life safety, programming, inmate complaints, staff 
working conditions, health care, recreation, and security.  The 
auditors also review records and interview administrators 
about statistical incident data provided by the facility (inmate-
inmate assaults, inmate-staff assaults, use of restraint chairs, 
suicide attempts/deaths, escapes, injuries, grievances 
filed/resolved for the inmates, etc.). 
The results of all of these audit elements are compiled into 
a report for the Commission staff and members.  While the 
compliance score is important, it is not, by any measure, the 
only factor that commissioners look to for guidance when 
making an accreditation decision.  Most commissioners pay 
close attention to the Quality of Life discussion, the incident 
data, and the comments/complaints of inmates and staff.  
Certainly, the efficacy of the audit team’s assessment is key to 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/17
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the ability of the commissioners to reach judgments concerning 
the facility’s accreditation status.  A score of 90% on non-
mandatory standards and 100% on mandatory standards is 
required; however, contrary to popular belief, these scores only 
make a facility eligible for consideration and do not by any 
means guarantee it.  It is not at all infrequent for agencies with 
scores in the 90-95% range to be denied initial or re-
accreditation, to receive a probationary status, or to be 
subjected to monitoring visits simply because they have missed 
20-30 standards, which is often, although not always, 
indicative of a larger set of concerns.  A poor quality of life 
assessment will frequently result in accreditation being denied 
or some alternative mechanism being required to provide 
assurance to the Commission that concerns will be addressed 
and remedied. 
Commissioners can entertain requests for waivers—for 
non-compliances deemed de minimus or where a statute 
requires a different course of action than a standard—or can 
require plans of action for non-compliances with deadlines 
associated with specific implementation steps.  Additionally, in 
recognition of political realities or forces beyond the agencies’ 
control, such as decisions by governors to suspend furloughs or 
union agreements that just cannot be undone, agencies can 
apply for a limited number of “discretionary non-compliances,” 
where failure to satisfy the standard is deemed to have no 
negative impact on the life, health, safety or constitutional 
operation of the facility.5 
The question then is whether the ACA standards and 
accreditation process, in and of itself, is a sufficient form of 
external oversight. 
The ACA accreditation process is as close as we currently 
get to a national corrections oversight process.  The standards 
are, by and large, well-conceived and indicative of sound 
correctional practices.  There is general agreement in the field 
 
5. The Commission of Accreditation implemented this policy in 2005 as a 
measure to increase the integrity of the process.  The objective was to allow 
agencies to avoid committing to plans of action that they knew they could not 
meet for political or policy reasons (e.g., a governor decreed that there would 
no longer be furloughs) or because of labor relations agreements that cannot 
be abrogated (e.g., collective bargaining agreements frequently allow staff to 
bid on posts and give management little or no leeway to require certain 
rotations as set forth in standards). 
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that the standards are reasonable and that the process of 
accreditation is extremely beneficial to participating agencies 
in terms of internal quality assurance and self-awareness 
enhanced by external oversight.  While pressure may 
sometimes be brought on the Association by applicant agencies, 
this hopefully occurs in relatively few cases and does not 
diminish the value of the process to all the other participating 
agencies.  Most people who have been involved in the ACA 
accreditation process as agency heads, facility administrators, 
auditors, or commissioners will say that while all accredited 
agencies are not necessarily model facilities, they are likely 
better than many or most facilities that are not accredited, and 
they are better facilities than they would otherwise be if they 
were not accredited.  The process of designing an operation 
around the widely accepted professional practices and 
standards, combined with the objective evaluation of a facility 
by professionals in the field, and the necessary follow-up 
activities to redress non-compliances, almost always results in 
improved operations.  This clearly is beneficial to inmates, staff 
and the public. 
As it is presently configured, however, the ACA standards 
and accreditation process does not alone satisfy some of the key 
elements of external oversight: it is not transparent and it does 
not generally enhance accountability, in terms of allowing the 
public or policy makers to hold corrections administrators 
responsible for the quality of institutions and how they care for 
people.  The fact that the accreditation process operates 
pursuant to a fee-based contract with a contractual guarantee 
of confidentiality clearly mitigates the degree to which it allows 
for transparency and accountability to the public.  This is not 
offered as criticism; it is the process that works best for the 
current goals and objectives of the accreditation process that 
the association and its applicants desire, and, as stated above, 
it is highly valuable from those perspectives.  However, the 
process does not satisfy other important objectives. 
I am reluctant to suggest that the existing ACA process be 
fundamentally altered to become the external oversight format 
of choice.  In some respects, the strength of the current 
standards and accreditation process of ACA is in the fact that it 
is voluntary.  The fact that the impetus for accreditation, on 
the part of many agencies at least, derives from an internal 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/17
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quest for enhanced professionalism can mean that there is 
more ownership in the process.  I worry that making it 
mandatory may result in agencies seeking shortcuts or 
attempting to deceive auditors because the objective will be the 
certificate, rather than an internal desire for excellent 
operations. 
The Maine experience referred to earlier offers some 
lessons.  Although the legislature mandated accreditation, each 
of the state’s adult and juvenile correctional facilities that have 
been working toward accreditation have viewed the process as 
more than something they must do because it was mandated.  
Facility staff members have invested great amounts of time 
and effort, plus a huge emotional investment, in ensuring that 
their facilities measure up to the ACA standards.6  Further, 
although any funding body can certainly require that the 
correctional agency share the results and content of an 
accreditation audit, in Maine, the legislative requirement 
means that policy makers clearly have access to the audit 
reports as a matter of legislative oversight, and this could be a 
step in the direction of transparency and increased 
accountability. 
While we can learn from Maine, we must consider that the 
application there is limited to state institutions, and there is 
presently only one ACA-accredited jail in the state.7  Requiring 
county jails and juvenile detention facilities to become 
accredited carries with it obvious funding questions and 
concerns about unfunded state mandates.  For that matter, a 
federal law mandating that states accredit all of their 
institutions would likely carry the same objection. 
Those of us who embrace the central tenets of external 
oversight should look to the ACA standards and to the ACA 
accreditation process as two existing mechanisms that have 
stood the test of time and offer much in the way of a foundation 
from which the external oversight movement can build.  While 
these mechanisms are not without their flaws, and bad 
incidents certainly do occur in accredited facilities, there is 
 
6. The author and his associates assisted the Maine Department of 
Corrections in the planning of new adult and juvenile facilities and 
development of policies and procedures that would meet ACA standards. 
7. The Cumberland County Jail in Portland, Maine was first accredited 
in 2002 and has subsequently been reaccredited. 
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much to be learned and applied.  Without question, we have 
many safer and more humane correctional facilities in this 
country because of the ACA standards and the accreditation 
process. 
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